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Abstract This paper gives an overview of logico-philosophical issues of time and
determinism. After a brief review of historical roots and 20th century developments,
three current research areas are discussed: the definition of determinism, space-time
indeterminism, and the temporality of individual things and their possibilities.
Keywords Determinism · Modal logic · Tense logic · Future contingents ·
Branching histories
1 Introduction
Perennial philosophical questions of time and determinism, often in combination,
have triggered important developments in logic. In return, such logical developments
have provided tools for philosophical inquiry, and their use has led to progress on
the philosophical side. The logico-philosophical discussion of time and determin-
ism thus stands out as a field in which the interaction between formal methods and
philosophical subject matter has succeeded in an exemplary fashion. In this paper
we will trace relevant developments in philosophical logic and mention three active
research topics: the definition of determinism, indeterminism and space-time, and
temporal/modal first-order logic. Our focus will be on philosophical problems for
which formal methods have proven to be helpful, rather than on the formal results
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themselves.1 We will stress the usefulness of branching histories frameworks for
tackling these problems. For reasons of space, we will have to leave by the wayside
the impact of discussions of time and determinism on computer science and artificial
intelligence.2
2 Historical Roots
In the Western logical tradition, philosophical puzzles of time and determinism have
been discussed explicitly from Aristotle onwards.3 A central issue is, and remains
to be, the open future and the so-called problem of future contingents. The idea that
the future is indeterministic or open—that there are different alternative possibilities
for the future—has several sources. We commonly acknowledge indeterminism with
respect to non-human natural affairs such as the weather, but the most important
source of our idea of indeterminism arguably lies in our own free actions affecting the
future. Aristotle’s vivid example from De Interpretatione is still used in present-day
discussions:4
[I]t is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it is not
necessary for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place—
though it is necessary for one to take place or not to take place. (19a30 ff.)
So what about the assertion “There will be a sea-battle tomorrow”? Two conflict-
ing intuitions come to the fore, apparently creating a problem for the core logical
notion of truth. One the one hand, it seems clear that the future is open in the relevant
respects: As of now, it is not yet determined whether there will be a sea-battle tomor-
row or not. On the other hand, we understand and often make assertions about the
future, even in indeterminate cases. And don’t we, in assertion, intend to speak the
truth—even though we can, of course, fail, and then speak falsely? Aristotle appears
to deny this:
Clearly, then, it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation
one should be true and the other false. (19a39 ff.)
Does this force us to accept a different status, perhaps a third truth value, for asser-
tions about future contingents, and reject the logical principle of bivalence? Or can
we give a different account of what is going on?
1For a comprehensive overview of technical developments in some areas of temporal logic, see Gabbay
et al. [15, 16].
2Øhrstrøm and Hasle [38] give an informative overview of the philosophical roots. Apart from the litera-
ture referred to in note 1, see also Van Eijck and Stokhof [48] for an overview of dynamic logics, and Xu’s
article in this volume for the logic of agency.
3This author cannot competently relate to other important logical traditions, and makes no claim to schol-
arly competence. See Gabbay and Woods [17] for recent overview articles on the Greek, Indian and Arabic
traditions, and see notes 4 and 6 for some scholarly references.
4 For scholarly commentary and translations, see Ackrill [1] and Weidemann [49]. We quote from the
former work, p. 53.
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One enticing idea is to re-interpret the original assumption that the world is not
(yet) determined as regards some future happening, in an epistemic way. Surely if
it is not yet determined what will happen tomorrow as regards the sea-battle, we
cannot know what will happen. But perhaps not knowing is all that is at issue, really:
Couldn’t it be that it will be one way or the other, determinately, but there is (perhaps
in principle) just no way for us to find out, except waiting and seeing? This move
would short-circuit the logical problems of truth: Our assertions would be plainly true
or false. The move would also provide an account of (epistemic) future indeterminacy
despite the (metaphysical) truth of determinism, i.e., despite there being just one
single possible future course of events.5
The epistemic story could be further strengthened if determinism—the metaphys-
ical claim that there is just one real possibility for the future—could be shown to
be unavoidable anyway. And indeed, future contingents have often been denounced
as a logical impossibility, which would amount to establishing determinism on log-
ical grounds. An important early argument to that effect was provided by Diodorus
Cronus: the so-called “master argument”, which claims that only that is possible
which either is the case or will be the case.6 Irrespective of the merits of that particu-
lar argument, the general idea of lifting a notion of possibility from purely temporal
notions (in this case, “Diodorean possibility”) has been important in the development
of temporal logic in the 20th century (see Section 3.2 below).
The ancient and medieval commentary tradition treats the problem of future con-
tingents at length. In the Christian era it takes on new importance in that even the
epistemic reading becomes problematic once an omniscient god enters the picture.
Many subtle issues arise due to a presupposition of human freedom (otherwise, God’s
moral judgment about humans seems unfair) and God’s omniscience implying that
for every φ, even if φ’s topic is a free human act, God knows whether φ.7
3 Time and Determinism: Logical Developments in the 20th Century
The rise of modern symbolic logic in the late 19th century took place in the con-
text of mathematics, for which issues of time and determinism apparently play no
role. This subject-related aspect was strengthened by the influence of the Kantian
tradition (certainly in the case of Frege), in which matters of modality were not
seen as pertaining to the content of a judgment, making a symbolic representation
of modality superfluous. If time is mentioned, it is in the form of a set of times over
which we can quantify (a time coordinate, familiar from physics). Thus Frege claims
that the appearance that one and the same sentence, “The tree outside is green”, is
5Note that whether one favours a metaphysical or an epistemic account of indeterminism, we have to
acknowledge that we apparently sometimes make assertions about that which we cannot know. So on both
accounts, some pragmatic story is needed to explain that fact.—For a recent contribution to the question
whether determinism and indeterminism are epistemically distinguishable, see Werndl [50].
6See, e.g., Gaskin [18] for details. See also Knuuttila [22] for pointers to more recent literature.
7God’s relation to time is another difficult issue, and there are many more. For a useful introduction to the
medieval discussion, see Adamson [2].
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true at one time and false at another, is misleading. It is rather that the sentence is
elliptical, leaving out the respective date; the full sentence is, e.g., “The tree out-
side is green on 8 July 2012”, which, if true, is true at all times (a so-called “eternal
sentence”).
Corresponding to this syntactical idea about the role of time for logic, there is
the semantic point that the proper notion of content for logical purposes should also
be eternal: The subject matter of logic should be free from modality and temporal
indexicality. Quine in Word and object [44] gives a forceful and influential exposition
of this view.
Worries about the adequacy of this approach, together with an interest in the
formalization of arguments from ancient and medieval sources, which required a
different treatment of time and modality, triggered some important logical develop-
ments. Here we only mention three. Łukasiewicz’s interest in Aristotle’s logic and the
question of future contingents led to the development of formal many-valued logic in
the 1920s (Section 3.1). In the middle of the 20th century, Prior worked out a formal
logic of tense (Section 3.2). Relatedly, a formal semantics for indexical notions was
established (Section 3.3).
3.1 Many-Valued Logic and Future Contingents
Jan Łukasiewicz, who studied Aristotle extensively, built a system with three in place
of two possible semantic values (extensions) for sentences, thereby rejecting the prin-
ciple of bivalence. He introduced a middle value, 1/2, as the semantic value of future
contingents, corresponding to possibility in the sense of an open future. Later he
extended his system to four values [26]. Many-valued logic is now a major research
area in logic, with many real-world applications.
A recalcitrant problem with Łukasiewicz’s approach to the issue of time and
modality, already with respect to Aristotle’s sea-battle example, is that he originally
rules a disjunction with two middle-value disjuncts to have the middle value, while
it seems clear that “either tomorrow there will be a sea-battle, or tomorrow there will
not be a sea-battle” should be true and not indeterminate. Alternative many-valued
truth tables face similar problems. Indeed it seems that an extensional treatment of fu-
ture contingents is bound to be unsatisfactory, and that an intensional logic is needed.
3.2 Tense Logic, Relational Semantics and Branching Histories
Arthur Prior created formal tense logic in the 1950s, in part as an explicit reaction
and alternative to Łukasiewicz’s extensionalism [42]. Prior started from the observa-
tion that there are certain stable structural dependencies between differently tensed
sentences. For example, if it is true that φ, then it will always be true that φ has been
the case. In tense logic, unmodified (atomic) sentences are present-tensed, and tem-
poral modifications are represented as one-place operators, often written P (past, “it
was the case that”) and F (future, “it will be the case that”). Their semantics is rela-
tional, naturally building on a linearly or partially ordered set of moments at which
formulae are to be evaluated. Thus, e.g., Pφ is true at a moment m iff there is an
earlier moment m′ s.t. φ is true at m′.
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At the time Prior was establishing tense logic, other authors were conduct-
ing semantical work in the foundations of modal logic that also led to relational
semantics—a true story of multiple discovery.8 The intuitiveness of thinking of
time as an ordering made tense logic a good testbed for developing ideas in rela-
tional semantics, including correspondence theory, incompleteness, the standard
translation, and hybrid logic. The inexpressibility of one quite natural demand for
a temporal ordering, irreflexivity, made expressive limitations of modal languages
vivid and highlighted the topic of admissible rules. Temporal logic has found its
way into many applications in computer science and artificial intelligence (see
note 1), forming the backbone of, e.g., model checking and models for concurrent
processes.
Philosophically, future contingents have remained among the pressing issues in
temporal logic. A crucial question is what the proper semantics for the future oper-
ator F should look like. Clearly, if the semantics is based on a linear ordering of
moments, the clause for F should just be the mirror image of that for P given above:
Fφ is true at a moment m iff there is a later moment m′ s.t. φ is true at m′. A linear
ordering implies that with respect to any moment, there is just one single possible
future course of events, which amounts to determinism. Thus, temporal possibility
can only be spelled out in the Diodorean fashion mentioned in Section 2 above: φ is
(Diodorean-)possibly true at m if it is either true at m, or will be true at some later
moment. It is however quite clear that this analysis does not capture an interest-
ing notion of the open future—as the sea-battle example shows, we are interested
in different, incompatible possibilities for the same time. One way to spell this out,
suggested to Prior by Kripke,9 was to think of moments as forming not a linear
total ordering, but a tree-like partial ordering. This ordering is a relational (Kripke-)
frame in the sense of modal logic, and together with a valuation constitutes a model.
Maximal linear chains in the frame, called histories, represent complete possible
courses of events. A Y -shaped branching tree with two histories can represent the
sea-battle scenario quite faithfully: There are two different moments at the same
time, tomorrow (two points on the different branches), and one of them represents the
occurrence, the other, the non-occurrence of a sea-battle. The question remains, how-
ever, how we are to understand the semantics of “There will be a sea-battle” on such
an approach. Several solutions have been proposed, the most prominent one being
the so-called Ockhamist solution. See Thomason [46, 47] for two important early
contributions to the discussion. Ockhamism forms the background for the important
Stit modal logic of agency.10 Still, other ways of using branching histories are being
explored. See Øhrstrøm [37] and Malpass and Wawer [29] for recent defenses of a
so-called “Thin Red Line” reading of branching histories, according to which one of
the histories can be singled out as the real one without thereby falling prey to deter-
minism. An important clarification in the debate has been reached by MacFarlane
8See Copeland [13] and Goldblatt [19] for historical details.
9See Ploug and Øhrstrøm [41] for the history.
10See Belnap et al. [8] as well as the separate paper by Xu in this volume.
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[27], who differentiates terminologically the task of giving a formal account of the
recursive semantics of F for use in embedded sentences, and of giving an account of
stand-alone sentences in terms of a non-recursive so-called “postsemantics”.11
3.3 Logical Treatment of Indexicals
Within the context of tense logic, the semantics of temporal indexicals such as
“now” or “tomorrow” also became a focus of interest. It seems obvious that “now”
refers to the time of utterance, so that, e.g., “now” is redundant in “It is now
raining”. Subtle issues however arise in embedded contexts, e.g., “Yesterday I
believed that it would now be raining”. Kamp established a number of important
formal results about “now” in the 1960s [20]; a general semantic framework for
indexicals was given by Kaplan [21]. This “two-dimensional semantics” has found
many other philosophical applications as well [12]. For a comprehensive scheme
for classifying various parameters of truth, expanding Kaplan’s considerations, see
Belnap et al. ([8], Ch. 6B). There is a direct line from these considerations to the new
semantic relativism of, e.g., MacFarlane [27, 28].
4 Current Topics
We single out three of the many interesting and worthwhile topics of current
philosophico-logical investigation, thereby indicating areas in which logic and
philosophy continue to interact to improve our understanding of time and deter-
minism: the definition of determinism (Section 4.1), determinism and space-time
(Section 4.2), and first-order logic (Section 4.3). As in the rest of this paper,
the selection is explicitly this author’s, who cannot claim to provide an unbiased
overview.
4.1 Defining Determinism
What is a proper formal definition of determinism? There appears to be a major
disconnect between the rather simple logical handling of determinism and inde-
terminism in tense logic, the finely differentiated discussions of the status of
determinism with respect to scientific theories in philosophy of science, and
the importance of determinism for other philosophical debates, e.g., about free
will.
Logical frameworks that allow one to differentiate deterministic from indetermin-
istic models, like the branching histories framework mentioned in Section 3.2 above,
often come with an extremely simple definition of determinism: In fact, for any
framework employing branching histories, a frame is deterministic iff it has just one
11See also Belnap [5] as well as the pragmatic account of word-giving in Belnap et al. ([8], Ch. 5C).—
For an extension of Ockhamism using local future possibilities (“transitions”) rather than histories, see
Rumberg [45].
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history, and indeterministic otherwise, and this property of the frame is also used to
classify models.12
In a possible worlds framework that rejects branching histories, such as the
“T × W” approach to combining time and modality (see Thomason [47]) or Lewis’s
modal realism [25], a purely frame-based definition is no longer appropriate. Once
the set of possible worlds W has more than one member, the resulting structure
has more than one maximal chain, i.e., more than one history (all of which are iso-
morphic to the set of times, T )—but still, a model based on such a frame could be
deterministic.13 The basic idea for defining determinism in the T × W framework is
that determinism means that the present state fixes future states uniquely; this idea
can be traced back to Laplace [24]. Formally this can be spelled out as follows: A
model 〈W,T,<, V 〉 is (future-)deterministic iff for any two w,w′ ∈ W , if there
is some t ∈ T for which V (w, t) = V (w′, t), then for any t∗ > t , we also have
V (w, t∗) = V (w′, t∗).14 A similar definition (with some added subtleties) was given
by Montague [30], but it is only appropriate for rather simple applications. Briefly,
there are two issues. One is that time translation shouldn’t matter, so that one can’t
insist on fixing one and the same time in both w and w′—one has to allow for dif-
ferent times t and t ′ at which to evaluate V . Secondly and more crucially, in physics
one has to take into account the widespread phenomenon of gauge freedom, which
means that several different mathematical representations can correspond to the same
physical state at a time. So one has to connect V (w, t) and V (w′, t ′) not via iden-
tity, but via some less stringent mapping, and similarly for the identification of the
worlds after the respective times.15 The resulting definition of determinism, directed
at the classification of scientific theories, goes as follows: “a theory is determinis-
tic if, and only if: for any two of its models, if they have instantaneous slices that
are isomorphic, then the corresponding final segments are also isomorphic” [11].16
This sounds like a logically stringent definition that invites widespread application,
but as a matter of fact it seems that after the time of Montague, who discussed two
simple classical theories, this definition has hardly ever been used to assess real
physical theories. Rather, what practitioners interested in the determinism or indeter-
minism of a theory do is to study that theory’s defining equations and assess whether
these equations admit unique solutions given initial values. This practice, however,
seems more congenial to a branching histories view of indeterminism than to a
12In an extreme case, this could mean that a model with two isomorphic histories on which the valuation
is exactly the same, would count as indeterministic. In order to exclude such cases, one can require that
a faithful model must reflect any branching in the underlying frame by a corresponding difference in
valuations. See, e.g., Placek and Belnap [39].
13A note on terminology: We here continue to use “model” in the logical sense, i.e., as a frame with a
valuation, incorporating different incompatible possible courses of events (histories) in one structure. In
philosophy of science, models are often required to represent just one temporal course of events, i.e., to be
what we here call a history plus valuation.
14A mirror-image, past-determinism, is defined by replacing “t∗ > t” with “t∗ < t”.
15For a comprehensive and authoritative discussion of the relevant issues, see Earman [14].
16In this quotation, “model” is used in the way common in philosophy of science, designating a single
history admitted by the scientific theory in question; see note 13 above.—One has to talk about slices
rather than states at times to account for space-time theories, see Section 4.2.
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“possible worlds plus mappings between them” approach. E.g., in the widely dis-
cussed example of simple indeterminism in Newtonian mechanics, Norton’s dome
[36], the defining ordinary differential equation has an infinite set of solutions for
certain initial data, but (allowing for temporal translations) only two non-isomorphic
temporal developments. A branching representation can capture the infinite size of
the solution space faithfully by picturing that solution space as one unified structure
with infinitely many histories branching off at specific moments.17 It seems bene-
ficial, therefore, to define indeterminism of scientific theories formally in terms of
branching structures, rather than holding on to the current situation in which there is
an official formal definition that is not actually used and which does not reflect the
work of the practitioners. The logical resources of branching histories make possi-
ble a simpler and more congenial definition of determinism and indeterminism that
reflects the concrete temporal structure of possibilities [35].
Such a change in the definition of determinism could also reflect back on the
role that determinism plays in various philosophical debates, e.g., on free will. The
most important issue seems to be the following: In the T × W framework, objective
uncertainty about what the future will bring is affirmed, but it is ultimately explained
epistemically, as uncertainty about which world w ∈ W one is located in. Each
of these worlds has a linear, deterministic development. This fixes a deterministic
picture of the temporal development of individuals that is far removed from our ordi-
nary self-conception as agents affecting the future course of things. In this author’s
view, the present state of the free will debate is still too much permeated by the idea
that ultimately, only determinism gives a truly scientific picture of the world. Incor-
porating an adequate model of indeterminism into the scientific discussion about
determinism of theories could help to remove this misconception.
4.2 Determinism and Space-Time
A related area in which the interaction between logic and philosophy of science
should be strengthened, concerns determinism and space-time. The definition of
determinism in philosophy of science has been heavily influenced by considerations
of space-time theories; Einstein’s “hole argument” played a decisive role (see But-
terfield [10]). The field shows the tension mentioned above: officially, determinism
in space-time theories is defined via mappings of “models” (single space-times), but
in fact, the behaviour of differential equations is studied. There is however avail-
able a branching histories framework for discussing space-time (in)determinism:
Belnap’s “branching space-times” [4].18 As this framework represents different pos-
sibilities in one unified formal structure, it provides a formal handle for studying
EPR-like modal correlations such as arise, e.g., in quantum mechanics; see Mu¨ller
et al. [34]. Further practical relevance of the framework may come from its close-
ness to formal structures used to study concurrent processes in computer science
(see Wron´ski [52]).
17For an explicit model, see Mu¨ller and Placek [35].
18For a discussion of topological issues, see Placek et al. [40] and Mu¨ller [33].
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4.3 Individuals and Their Possibilities
Perhaps the biggest lacuna in the development of logical tools for understanding
time and determinism, in the view of this author, is the absence of individual things
from the scene. It is quite understandable that in computer science, which is driving
most technical developments in modal and temporal logic, the interest in predicate
logic is limited—applications require tractable systems. For philosophical purposes,
however, an adequate modeling of things, their temporal development and their
possibilities is certainly required.
Time and determinism interact with the metaphysical discussion about things in
two ways, which are mostly treated separately. First, there is the question of the tem-
poral development of things, of identity through successive changes—the question of
persistence. Second, there is the question of what is possible for a thing—the issue
of de re modality—that is variously discussed under the headings of laws, disposi-
tions, or powers. Logically speaking, what seems to be required is a combination
of temporal-modal (intensional) logic with quantification theory: quantified modal
logic. Several systems have been proposed since the 1940s, starting with the syntac-
tic investigations of Barcan [3]. An important semantical investigation, employing
relational frames, is Kripke [23]. Most of these systems combine modality and
quantification without explicit formal attention to time; an exception is Wo¨lfl [51].
Almost all such systems (including Wo¨lfl) work with a formal representation of
things that is only adequate for a metaphysical picture of “bare particulars”: Things
are represented as mere labels, as pegs to hang properties on, but their representation
includes no internal variation that would reflect change. A thing is simply present at a
world (or at a world/time index) or not. Change is rather represented on the side of the
extension of properties at worlds (or world/times). Thus, typically, one has a domain
of things per world, the union of which determines the total domain of possibilia.
Variables are then interpreted along the lines of the idea of “rigid designation”, i.e.,
as picking out the same thing in each world (or nothing, if the thing doesn’t exist in
that world).
This way of looking at things in time may suffer from the same extensionalist idea
mentioned above in connection with Łukasiewicz—that everything in logic has to
boil down to extensions. Established temporal and modal logics deviate from this idea
and introduce intensional operators at the sentential level: For example, the semantic
value (extension) of Pφ at m isn’t a (truth-)function of the semantic value of φ at m,
but depends on the course of values of φ at different moments m′. I.e., the extension
of Pφ at m is a function of the intension of φ.
A similar move at the level of terms is also possible, but has not been researched
much. Bressan [9] proposed a framework of quantified modal logic in which vari-
ables do not function as rigid designators, but as terms with a (possibly non-constant)
intension and an extension in each case;19 predication is generally intensional. In
19“Case” is Bressan’s general word for temporal/modal alternatives.—Bressan’s original modal system
MLν is higher order and quite complex. Its expressive resources are comparable to Montague’s more
well-known IL [31], but MLν does not require explicit type conversions as in IL.
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case-intensional first oder logic [7], which derives from Bressan’s work, a predica-
tion (α) is true or false at a case (e.g., at a moment in time) depending on the
intension (course of extensions at moments) of α. Thereby, modal properties de re
(such as, e.g., dispositions) are represented as properties of a thing directly, classi-
fying the intension of a term α. The persistence conditions of a thing can also be
expressed via intensional predication, employing Bressan’s ground-breaking idea of
absolute properties. In this way, the two aspects relating things with the issues of time
and determinism, persistence and modality de re, come together in one formal sys-
tem.20 The formal aspects of the respective limitations of indeterminism due to things
around us [43] still need to be spelled out more clearly. Embarking on this project
would hopefully allow formal logic to make good on another insight due to Aristotle,
viz., that an argument for indeterminism can be based on very simple considerations
of things around us:
[I]n things that are not always actual there is the possibility of being and of
not being [. . .]. Many things are obviously like this. For example, it is possible
for this cloak to be cut up, and yet it will not be cut up but wear out first.
But equally, its not being cut up is also possible [. . .]. Clearly, therefore, not
everything is or happens of necessity [. . .]. (19a9 ff.)
We know many things about the world around us, just by being part of it. It remains
a task of philosophical logic to reflect that knowledge adequately. Time and deter-
minism remain core topics of philosophical reflection in the 21st century, and new
formal methods can continue to help clarify our thinking about these topics.
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